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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
------------------------------------------
ATKIN, WRIGHT & MILES, 
Chartered, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, et al., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 18232 
Because Respondent's Brief misstated or distorted the 
facts in several important particulars, it is necessary for 
Mountain Bell to respond thereto as follows: 
1. While Respondents claim that the only listing error 
occurred in the yellow page listing for the Allen firm, the 
fact is that another error was made in the white page listing 
for the Allen firm, wherein the residence addresses and 
telephone numbers for the firm members preceded the firm's 
address and number, contrary t_o the listing order in prior 
and subsequent issues of the directory (Ex. 1, p. 94; Tr. 201). 
Thus, for example, a person seeking the services of Michael 
Hughes, a member of the Allen firm, might be directed by the 
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white pages to call his residence, and by the yellow pages 
to call the Atkin firm's number. 
2. The Telalease, which Respondent claims is a contract 
for a specific telephone number, nowhere contains a provision 
that specifically grants Respondent a right ~o the number. 
A telephone number was inserted merely for identification 
purposes, together with the firm's name and address, but 
there was no provision stating that that number was a term 
of the Telalease. By its terms, the Telalease is simply an 
equipment lease (Ex. 6, • 1). It specifically incorporates 
all applicable tariffs, is fully integrated, and provides 
that Mountain Bell is not bound by any representations not 
set forth therein (Ex. 6, ! 8). 
3. The initial decision to place an intercept on the 
Atkin firm-' s line was neither arbitrary nor without prior 
notice. (Tr. 208.) Mountain Bell's General Attorney, Kenneth 
Madsen, met with representatives of both the Allen firm and 
the Atkin firm to discuss the problem prior to implementing 
the intercept, and various alternatives were considered. 
(Tr. 179-80, 182, 189, 193-94, 199-200, 630-34.) The intercept 
procedure was chosen in order to direct callers to the law 
firm they wished to reach, and was the most reasonable 
approach available under the circumstances. (Tr. 630-34.) 
4. The Amended Complaint (R. 81-92) claimed damages 
resulting only from the mechanical intercept, which was in 
effect for only thirty-six hours (Tr. 538-39.) Respondent 
-2-
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did not amend its Complaint after the live intercept was 
implemented to allege damages resulting therefrom. Nevertheless, 
Respondent was permitted, over objection, to introduce 
evidence supporting damages that allegedly arose as a result 
of deficiencies in the operation of the live intercept, 
which was placed some four months after. the mechanical 
intercept was removed. Respondent did not move to amend its 
Complaint to conform to the evidence, nor did the Court make 
any such order sua sponte. 
5. Though Mountain Bell supported an intercept procedure 
generally, it never endorsed the live operator intercept 
procedure before_ the Public Service Commission; rather, 
Respondent insisted on a live operator intercept if the 
Commission determined that an intercept should be placed, 
notwithstanding Mountain Bell's warnings concerning the 
difficulty of operating a live intercept with consistency 
and accuracy. (Tr. 421-24.) 
6. No witness for the Atkin firm stated that he sought 
advice or legal services from another attorney as a result 
of the difficulties with the live operator intercept. Nor 
did any witness testify that he or she lost faith in the 
Atkin firm because of the difficulties or blamed the Atkin 
firm therefor. 
7. With regard to the Atkin firm's special damages for 
reprinting stationery, etc., the evidence was that Mountain 
Bell had offered to pay for such expenses. (Tr. 192, 662-63.) 
-3-
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In any event, however, the jury did not award any amount as 
and for special damages. (Tr. 782.) 
8. The evidence shows no reduction in the Atkin firm's 
annual revenue during the period the directory with the 
erroneous listing was in effect. (Tr. 525-29, Ex. 27.) The 
bulk of evidence of damage was with respect to projected 
income. (Tr. 522~ 529-36.) 
ARGUMENT 
The Atkin firm argues passionately that the jury verdict 
should be affirmed because there was substantial evidence to 
support it. Mountain Bell disputes that there was such 
evidence. The important point, however, is that no verdict 
can be sustained where the trial court has committed prejudicial 
errors of law. 
In the present case, the errors of law were numerous, 
and include: the trial court's failure to rule that Mountain 
Bell cannot be held liable for actions taken consistent with 
a filed tariff (see Appellant's Brief, pp. 8-16); its failure 
to hold that Mountain Bell cannot be held liable for following 
a specific order of the Public Service Commission (see Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 16-22); its failure to limit Mountain Bell's 
liability as a matter of law as a result of applicable 
tariffs (see Appellant's Brief, pp. 34-36); its jury instructions 
that a contract existed for a specific telephone number (see 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 23-25); its failure to include Mountain 
-4-
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Bell's theories of defense adequately in the jury instructions 
(see Appellant's Brief, pp. 25-30); and its failure to rule 
or instruct the jury that the placement of the intercept was 
reasonable, just, fair and equitable, and that the court and 
jury were bound by the findings of the Public Service 
Connnission (see Appellant's Brief, pp. 30-33). 
POINT I 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, MOUNTAIN BELL'S ACTIONS 
WERE REASONABLE, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND 
LAWFUL; HENCE THERE IS NO BASIS FOR LIABILITY. 
A. The Public Service Corrnnission Order and Findings 
establish conclusivel that Mountain Bell's actions were fair, 
reasona t e pu ic interest. 
In its Brief, Respondent has totally ignored perhaps 
the most critical fact in this case--that the Public Service 
Connnission (PSC) found, not just as a general proposition, 
but with respect to the specific facts of this case: (1) 
that tariff Section 20(N)(l) was valid and applicable and 
precluded Respondent from asserting any.property right to 
any specific telephone number; and (2) that the intercept 
and number change procedure, which formed the sole basis for 
Respondent's Complaint, was llfair", "equitable", "reasonable", 
and "just". (R. 129-130A.) The PSC order based on those 
findings was confirmed by this Court when it dissolved the 
preliminary injunction. 
The PSC order resulted from a hearing in which Respondent 
participated fully, the Commission holding that Respondent 
-5-
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had made a general appearance by virtue of its participa-
tion. (Ex. 24 at 95-98.) The findings and order were not 
appealed and became final; hence, they could not be attacked 
collaterally. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-14. Nevertheless, the 
trial court's jury instructions ignored these facts and 
erroneously permitted the jury to assess damages on findings 
that were in direct conflict with the PSC order. 
Thus, the cases cited by Respondent are distinguishable 
from the present case. In Muskegon Agency, Inc. v. General 
Telephone Co., 340 Mich. 472, 65 N.W.2d 748 (1954) and 350 
Mich. 41, 85 N.W.2d 170 (1957), for example, a telephone 
company was held liable, not.because it had placed an intercept, 
but because it had changed plaintiff's telephone number and 
refused to place an intercept, and further prevented all 
calls from reaching the plaintiff over the printed telephone 
number. Furthermore, the Michigan court there held that the 
case did not involve an error in listings; rather, the error 
was in negligently assigning plaintiff a number that had 
a~ready been assigned to another party; no tariff limitation 
of liability for that kind of action existed at that time. 
Id. at 750-52. See also Valentine v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 
388 Mich. 19, 199 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1972). In any event, 
Muskegon is "contrary to the great weight of authority". 
Warner v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 428 S.W.2d 596, 
602 (Mo. App. 1968), cited with approval by the Michigan 
court in Valentine, supra, 199 N.W.2d at 184, n.l. 
-6-
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Similarly, in Clayton Home Equipment Co. v. Florida 
Telephone Corp., 152 So.2d 203 (Fla. App. 1963), the court 
held that an allegation that the telephone company had 
"arbitrarily and without just cause" withdrawn plaintiff's 
telephone number was sufficient to state a claim. In addition, 
the Court there made no mention of an applicable tariff 
limitation of liability. 
Product Research Associates v. Pacific Telephone & 
Telegraph Co., 16 Cal. App. 3d 654, 94 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1971), 
cited by Respondent, is distinguishable on its facts, but 
more importantly, it has been ~xpressly overruled in Waters v. 
Pacific Telephone Co., 12 Cal. 3d 1, 523 P.2d 1161, 114 Cal. 
Rptr. 753 (1974) (see 523 P.2d at 1167, n.10). 
In the present case, the finding by the Public Service 
Commission that Mountain Bell's action in changing the Atkin 
firm's number was reasonable and just under the circumstances 
precludes a contrary conclusion. 
B. The court erred in instructin the jury that it could 
find a contract or a telephone number. 
The intercept procedure was proper because, as the 
Public Service Commission found, the Atkin firm had no 
property right in the telephone number and under the circumstances, 
Mountain Bell had just cause to change it. That finding 
disposes of Respondent's argument that it had a right to the 
number based on negotiations with Mountain Bell's employee, 
Dennis Wood, and based on the Telalease. Wood did not have 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the power to enter a contract on behalf of Mountain Bell 
that was contrary to the tariff. See Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-7 
("[N]o public utility shall ... extend to any person any form 
of contract or agreement ... except such as are regularly and 
uniformly extended to all corporations and persons"). See 
also Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-8 (prohibiting preferences). 
With respect to the argument that the Telalease constituted 
a contract for a particular number, it is sufficient to note 
that the Telalease is an equipment lease only and that it 
contains no provision granting the lessee the right to a 
specific telephone number. Furthermore, the Telalease is 
fully integrated and specifically incorporates all applicable 
tariff provisions (including, therefore, Tariff Section 20(N)(l) 
denying a right to a particular telephone number). (See Ex. 
6, , 8.) 
Respondent's reliance on Tariff Section 20(B) and the 
Private Line Tariff to establish a ''contract for a telephone 
number" is misplaced. Those tariffs refer only to a contract 
between Mountain Bell and its.-subscriber for telephone 
service, not a telephone number. If, as Respondent insists, 
the relationship between the Telephone Company and its 
subscribers is characterized as contractual, then the terms 
of the contract are the tariff provisions, including Section 
20(N)(l), which denies the subscriber a right to any particular 
~umber. See Waters v. Pacific Telephone Co., 12 Cal. 3d 1, 
523 P.2d 1161, 1162, 114 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1974). 
-8-
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C. Mountain Bell did not violate Tariff Section 20(E)(4). 
In ~espouse to Mountain Bell's argument that its liability 
is limited by Tariff Section 20(E)(3), Respondent argues 
that Mountain Bell violated Tariff Section 20(E)(4) by 
inserting itself into a controversy between customers. That 
argument is patently absurd. In the first place, that 
section of the tariff typically applies where a business 
splits up and more than one faction asserts the right to retain 
use of a published telephone number, which was not the case 
here. More importantly, this action was not a controversy 
between customers; rather, it was a con.troversy between the 
Allen firm (whose number had been incorrectly printed and 
which vehemently protested to Mountain Bell and threatened 
suit against Mountain Bell), and Mountain Bell (which had 
committed the error). The Atkin firm was necessarily drawn 
into the controversy because its number was the one printed 
for the Allen firm. The resolution of the problem necessarily 
required action by Mountain Bell; hence, it could not avoid 
being a party to the controversy. 
In summary, the findings of the Public Service Commission 
that the Atkin firm had no property right in the telephone 
number and that Mountain Bell was justified in putting into 
operation the intercept and number change procedure established 
that Mountain Bell's actions were reasonable and lawful; 
therefore, as a matter of law Mountain Bell is not liable 
for such actions. 
-9-
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POINT II 
TARIFF LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY LIMIT 
MOUNTAIN BELL'S LIABILITY FOR ALLEGED 
DEFICIENCIES IN PROVISION OF TELEPHONE 
SERVICE, INCLUDING THE OPERATION OF THE 
INTERCEPTS. 
A. Mountain Bell's liability for directory errors and 
service interruptions or malfunctions is limited by tariff. 
Respondent's argument that the Public Service Commission 
does not have jurisdiction over the furnishing of paid 
advertising in the yellow pages, while correct, misses the 
point on several scores. First, the error in the yellow 
pages (the listing of Atkin's number for the Allen firm) was 
an error in the initial yellow page listing of the Allen 
firm, which, under the categorization of 74 Am. Jur. 2d 
Telecommunications § 32, is a "type l" error, over which the 
Commission does have jurisdiction, under the authority of 
Allen v. General Telephone Co., 20 Wash. App. 144, 578 P.2d 
1333 (1978), and other cases cited in Appellant's Brief 
(pp. 34-36). The fact that the error was printed in bold type 
is of no consequence because the Atkin firm's number should 
not have been printed at all in the Allen firm's initial listing. 
Therefore, the tariff limitation of liability (Section 
20(E)(3)) applies. See Allen, supra, which applied a similar 
tariff limitation where the plaintiff's initial yellow page 
listi~g was omitted, even though plaintiff had contracted 
for that listing to be in bold print. 
Respondent acknowledges that such a limitation would 
apply to the Allen firm (see Respondent's Brief, pp. 22-23), 
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but in a classic example of a double standard, asserts that 
the limitation should not apply to it. However, the language 
of the limitation does not limit Mountain Bell's liability 
only as to those customers in whose listings an error appears. 
It states: 
The Telephone Company's liability arising from 
errors in or omissions of directory listings shall 
be limited to and satisfied by a refund not exceeding 
the amount of the charges for such of the customer's 
service as is a_ffected during the period covered by 
the directory ih which the error or omission occurs. 
The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company General 
Exchange Tariff§ 20(E)(3). 
Thus the limitation applies to any customer whose 
service is affected by a listing error. 
There is a second respect iri which Respondent's argument 
that the Commission ha.s no jurisdiction over yellow page 
advertising misses the point. Respondent's action for 
damages does not arise directly out of the error in the 
Allen firm's listing; rather, it arises out of the change in 
its telephone service which was implemented to correct the 
listing error. More specifically, the bulk of Respondent's 
claimed damage allegedly arose out of deficiencies in the 
operation of the intercepts. 
It may be argued that even the alleged deficiencies 
with the Respondent's service arose out of the listing 
error, since it was.the listing error that necessitated the 
intercepts. A similar situation was presented in Warner v. 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 428 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. App. 1968). 
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In that case, plaintiff's listing appeared in the wrong 
geographical section of the directory for two consecutive 
years. As a result, operators told long distance callers 
trying to obtain plaintiff's number from the directory 
assistance service trat no such business was listed in the 
town where plaintiff was located. Plaintiff argued that the 
tariff limitation of liability relating to directory errors 
was inapplicable because the "mislisting" was not merely in 
the directories but was continued at the toll centers for 
the long distance and information operators. Notwithstanding 
the fact that plaintiff's claimed damages arose from failure 
of the operators to give correct information to callers, the 
court applied the tariff limitation of liability relating to 
directory errors, stating that the "whole difficulty arose 
out of the errors in the directories". Id. at 600. See 
also Garrison v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 45 
Ore. App. 523, 608 P.2d 1206, 1211 (1980), in which the 
court observed: 
Rates, service.levels, and the remedy for erroneous 
listings or service failures are inseparable. 
The provision of telephone service is undoubtedly 
within the Public Service Connnission's jurisdiction, and 
Respondent does not suggest otherwise. Telephone service is 
provided pursuant and subject to the tariffs filed with the 
Public Service Commission. One ,such tariff which specifically 
limits Mountain Bell's liability for errors in the furnishing 
of telephone service is Section 20(G)(5), which provides: 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Apart from the credit allowance stated above, [which 
simply gives the customer proportionate credit against 
local service charges for the period of time the service 
is not functioning, provided notice has been given to 
the Telephone Company] , no liability shall attach to 
the Telephone Company for damages arising from errors, 
mistakes, omissions, interruptions, or delays of the 
Telephone Company, its agents, servants, or employees, 
in the course of establishing, furnishing, rearranging, 
moving, terminating, or changing the service or 
facilities (including the obtaining or furnishing of 
information in respect thereof or with respect to 
subscribers or users of the service or facilities), 
in the absence of gross negligence or willful misconduct. 
Such a tariff is valid and applies to limit Mountain Bell's 
liability for the alleged deficiencies in operation of the 
intercepts. See, ~' Waters v. Pacific Telephone Co.,_ 12 Cal. 
3d 1, 523 P.2d 1161, 114 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1974), and other cases 
cited in Appellant '.s Brief, pp. 34-35. 
The policy behind such limitations of liability is 
aptly expressed in Cole v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
112 Cal. App. 2d 416, 246 P.2d 686, 688 (1952): 
The theory underlying these decisions is that a public 
utility, being strictly regulated in all operations 
with considerable curtailment of its rights and 
privileges shall likewise be regulated and limited 
as to its liabilities. In consideration of its being 
peculiarly the subject of state control, 'its liability 
is and should be defined and limited' ... There is 
nothing harsh or inequitable in upholding such a limitation 
of liability when it is thus considered that the rates as 
fixed by the Commission are established with the rule of 
limitation in mind. Reasonable rates are in part dependent 
upon such a rule. 
(Citations omitted.) 
The very existence of such a tariff provision is an 
acknowledgement that the telephone company cannot guarantee 
that its service will always operate perfectly. See 
Hamilton Employment Service v. New York Telephone Co., 
_, ".l _ 
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253 N.Y. 468, 171 N.E. 710 (1930). When Respondent did not 
receive perfect service, therefore, it became subject to the 
limitation of liability which was designed for just such an 
occurrence. 
B. Mountain Bell's actions did not constitute gross 
negligence or willful misconduct. 
Respondent seeks to avoid the application of the tariff 
limitation of liability by arguing that the exception relating 
to "gross negligence or willful misconduct" applies in this 
case. The Public Service Commission's findings that the 
number chan&e and intercept procedure were "fair" and "reasonable" 
are sufficient response to Respondent's argument. Further, 
the circumstances of the case support the reasonableness of 
Mountain Bell's actions. Mountain Bell did not derive, nor 
could it expect to derive, any special benefit from placing 
an intercept on Respondent's line. On the contrary, Mountain 
Bell was put to considerable trouble and expense to place 
the intercept. The only reason it did so was to serve the 
public interest, so that members of the public who called 
the number listed for both the Allen firm and the Atkin firm 
could be directed to the appropriate firm. There was no 
other realistic solution to the problem created by the 
listing error. Furthermore, not to have placed the intercept 
might have led to claims by the Allen firm of discrimination, 
inadequate service, gross negligence and willful misconduct, 
to say nothing of th.e possibility of a contempt citation by 
-14-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Public Service Commission. Mountain Bell followed the 
law which requires a public utility to follow orders, rules 
and regulations of the Public Service Commission. Utah Code 
Ann. § 54-3-23. For these reasons, it was error for the 
trial court to instruct the jury that it could find that 
Mountain Bell was guilty of gross negligence or willful 
misconduct (which the trial court erroneously equated; 
see Instruction 5-G, R. 320). 
The cases cited by Respondent on the issue of tariff 
limitation of liability for service problems are instructive 
and support Mountain Bell's position. In Pilot Industries v. 
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 495 F. Supp. 356 
(D.S.C. 1979), plaintiff sued the telephone company for 
damages, consisting of lost business, allegedly resulting 
from interruptions in telephone service as well as errors in 
directory listings. The evidence was that despite numerous 
complaints to the telephone company, plaintiff had experienced 
trouble with its lines affecting incoming WATS calls for a 
period of 41 days. Southern Bell asserted that a tariff, 
very similar to ·section 20(G)(5), limited its liability. 
Applying the tariff, the court held that under the facts of 
that case, there was no evidence of gross negligence or willful 
misconduct sufficient to avoid the tariff limitation. 
The Court in Pilot Industries quoted from Rogers v. 
Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 106 S.E. 2d 258 (1958) 
regarding the proper test for determining whether an act can 
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be characterized as reckless, willful, or wanton, stating 
that the determination is made by ascertaining whether the 
act complained of 
has been committed in such a manner or under such 
circumstances that a person of ordinary reason or 
prudence would then have been conscious of it as 
an invasion of the plaintiff's rights ... It is 
this resent consciousness of wron doin that 
justi ies the assessment o punitive damages ... ; 
and it has been variously referred to as 'conscious 
failure to observe due care;' ... 'conscious 
indifference to the rights of others,' ... and 
as 'gross disregard of the rights of the person 
injured' ... But the common denominator of these 
expressisns is the test before mentioned, viz: 
that at the time of his act or omission to act 
the tort feasor be conscious, or chargeable with 
consciousness, of his wrongdoing. 
Id. at 263-264. (Emphasis added by the court.) 
Under that test, Mountain Bell would clearly not be guilty 
of gross negligence or willful misconduct in this case, 
since the record is clear that Mountain Bell believed its 
acts to be lawful and within the powers granted to it under 
the tariffs. The Public Service Commission confirmed that 
belief by its findings. 
The Cou·rt in Pilot Industries further quoted from 
Holman v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 358 F. Supp. 727 
(D. Kan. 1973), which granted summary judgment for the 
telephone company on the basis of a tariff limitation of 
liability, holding as a matter of law that the following 
acts and omissions did not constitute willful or wanton 
conduct sufficient to come within the exception to the 
tariff limitation of liability: 
-16-
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A. The plaintiffs' telephone number did not ring when 
persons dialed the plaintiffs' telephone number. 
B. Persons dialing the plaintiffs' telephone number 
received a busy signal when in fact none of the 
plaintiffs' telephones were in use. 
C. Persons calling the plaintiffs' telephone could 
hear the answering party faintly, however, the parties 
were not able to communicate. 
D. The plaintiffs' equipment did not work in conjunction 
with the main body of telephone equipment and did not 
function as normal telephone equipment functions. 
E. Other telephone calls were superimposed upon those 
of the plaintiffs. 
F. A mechanical intercept would erroneously advise 
callin laintiffs' telephone numbers that the 
ers were no anger in service. 
G. Defendant failed to properly maintain the equipment 
connecting plaintiffs' telephones with the- central 
offices out of which plaintiffs' telephones were 
maintained, and defendant faiied to maintain properly 
the telephone equipment installed by the defendant 
upon plaintiffs' premises .... 
H. Defendant failed to furnish a sufficient number of 
sufficiently-trained personnel to repair the equipment 
when it malfunctioned, both at plaintiffs' premises 
and in the central offices noted. 
Id. at 730 (emphasis added). 
In Wilkinson v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
327 Mass. 132, 97 N.E.Zd 413 (1951), also quoted in Pilot 
Industries, supra, the court reached a similar conclusion 
where plaintiff complained numerous times about faulty 
service over a period of about five months. 
In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Rucker, 537 
S.W.2d 326, 332-33 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), a similar case, 
the court stated: 
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While the record is replete with instances 
when the station could not broadcast because of 
problems with telephone company lines, or interference 
with lines between.the station and transmitter, we 
find no evidence that the error in reconnecting 
the remote control lines at the transmitter resulted 
from an entire want of care which would raise the 
belief that the acts or omissions were the result of 
a conscioui indifference to the rights or welfare of 
the persons to be affected by them. This has long been 
the requirement in a gross negligence case. 
The court in Rucker refused to apply the exception to the 
tariff limitation of liability under the circumstances of 
that case. 
Closer to home, in Olson v. Mountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph Co., 119 Ariz. 321, 580 P.2d 782 (1978), the 
plaintiff complained of loss of business from a failure to 
place an intercept, alleging a series of acts which plaintiff 
claimed fell within a "willful and deliberate" exception to 
the tariff limitation of liability. The evidence was that 
many customers had difficulty in reaching plaintiff and some 
did not reach her at all (similar to the allegations of the 
Atkin firm in the present case). Rejecting the argument 
that Mountain Bell's acts, taken together, constituted 
willful conduct, the court granted.Mountain Bell summary 
judgment, stating: 
A plaintiff cannot establish intentional and 
deliberate conduct within the tariff's exception to 
the limitation on liability merely by showing a 
series of negligent acts. 
Id. at 784. 
Finally, in Warner v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 
428 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. App. 1968), the court held as a matter 
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of law that the evidence was not sufficient to establish 
willful, wanton or reckless conduct under facts significantly 
more egregious than in the present case (see discussion, 
supra, pp. 11-12). 
Considering the case l~w cited, together with the 
Public Service Commission finding that Mountain Bell's 
number change and intercept procedure was fair and reasonable, 
this Court should hold as a matter of law that Mountain 
Bell's conduct did not constitute gross negligence or willful 
misconduct. Hence, the tariff limitations of liability 
apply and the damage award must be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE DAMAGE VERDICT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
A. There was no substantial evidence of lost business. 
Respondent did not plead special damage with specificity, 
as required by Rule 9(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor 
was the issue of special damages submitted to the jury. 
The verdict specifically states that "general damages" were 
being awarded. (R. 336.) The question, therefore, is 
whether an award ·of general damage is supported by the 
evidence. Mountain Bell contends it is not because Respondent 
failed to produce any evidence of actual loss of business 
proximately caused by the alleged problems with telephone 
service. 
The only evidence of lost business Respondent could 
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point to in support of the verdict is that some clients had 
difficulty in telephoning Respondent. One witness, Richard 
Hunter, testified that a problem he wished to consult with a 
member of the firm about resolved itself before he could 
reacb Mr. Miles (Tr. 292). Such evidence is clearly not 
substantial enough to support a verdict for $25,000.00. The 
fact is that there was absolutely no evidence that any 
client of Respondent took any legal business to another 
lawyer as a result of difficulties with the telephone 
service. 
The testimony and exhibit introduced by John Miles on 
the issue of damages was highly speculative in that it dealt 
primarily with projected income, rather than with actual 
income. The evidence on actual income showed that the 
firm's annual income for 1980 increased over 1979 and the 
income for 1981 increased over 1980. Regardless of the 
income figures, however, there is a glaring lack of evidence 
of a causal connection between the operation of the intercepts 
and the supposed drop in projected income. 
Plaintiff's evidence of damage thus falls short of the 
standard required by the law. In Wade v. Southwestern Bell 
Telephone Co., 352 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), the 
court held that plaintiff, an attorney, had not met his 
burden in proving loss of business "to a reasonable degree 
of certainty" in a directory omission case. The court 
described plaintiff's burden thusly: 
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The burden was upon appellant to allege and 
prove the loss of profits and that such loss resulted 
from the alleged breach of contract by appellee and 
that such loss of profits must be established with 
a reasonable degree of certainty and cannot be left 
to speculation. 
Id. at 462. 
The court also set forth the following test for proving 
damages for loss of business: 
Id. 
First, plaintiff must prove that he actually 
did lose some business as a result of the alleged 
breach of contract. 
Second, plaintiff must show that this loss of 
business resulted in a loss in his net profits for 
it is only loss of profits for which the law allows 
recovery. 
Third, plaintiff must establish this loss of net 
profits with a reasonable degree of certainty for 
recovery may not be had where proof of lost profits 
is uncertain or speculative, especially where the 
claim is based upon alleged breach of an advertising 
contract. 
Accord Augustine v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
91 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1956). In Wade, which presented a more 
plausible case for damages than the instant case (because 
plaintiff's listing was completely omitted), the court noted 
that, as in the present case, there was no proof of loss of 
any particular piece of business; hence, plaintiff's claim 
for loss was "wholly speculative" and the directed verdict 
was affirmed. 
In Mitchell v .. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 298 
S.W.2d 520 (Mo. App. 1957), plaintiff sued the telephone 
company for loss of business allegedly arising out of an 
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incorrect number listing. Plaintiff's witnesses testified, 
among other things, of a drastic reduction in the number of 
calls received during the period the directory with the 
erroneous number was in effect. Although the evidence was 
the best available, the court held that it was still speculative 
since, as in this case, the company earnings were greater 
than the year before and the claimed loss was reached by 
"estimate upon estimate, which left the whole matter in the 
realm of conjecture or speculation." Id. at 523. 
In Monter v. Kratzers Specialty Bread Co., 29 Utah 2d 
18, 504 P.2d 40 (1972), this court held that although the 
defendant lost a major customer because of plaintiff's 
wrongful eviction (the customer being unable to contact 
defendant), the judgment for substantial general damages 
consisting of projected lost profits was speculative and 
could not stand, stating that in such circumstances, only 
nominal damages could be awarded. Applying the rationale of 
Monter to the present case, this Court should hold a fortiori 
(because Respondent showed no loss of clients) that Respondent 
is entitled to judgment for nominal damages at most. Accord 
Page v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 418 N.E.2d 
1217 (Mass. 1981); Gould v. Mountain States Telephone 
& Telegraph Co., 6 Utah 2d 187, 309 P.2d 802, 803 (1957). 
The other cases cited by Respondent on the issue of 
damages are distinguishable. In Southwestern Bell Telephone 
Co. v. Reeves, 578 S.W.2d 795 .(Tex. Civ. App. 1979), the 
judgment for an attorney for lost business resulting from a 
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failure to intercept calls was sustained upon proof that a 
major client of the attorney obtained legal services elsewhere 
and paid other lawyers substantial amounts because he could 
not contact the plaintiff. Cf. Gould v. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra; Mountain States TeJephone & 
Telegraph Co. v. Hinchcliffe, 204 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1953). 
There is no such evidence in the present case. 
In B & W Rustproofing, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 
88 Mich. App. 242, 276 N.W.2d 572 (1979), cited by Respondent, 
the question of sufficiency of evidence of damage was neither 
raised nor discussed. 
In Sommerville v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 
258 F. 147 (D.C. Cir. 1919), cited by Respondent, a judgment 
for $.11 was reversed, but the court never dealt with the 
question of the proper measure of damages for lost business, 
nor with the proper standard of proof thereof. 
In summary, under the authority cited, the evidence in 
this case should be held to be too speculative to support an 
award of compensatory damage, where there is no evidence of 
actual loss of business, and the claimed loss of business is 
based on unsupported projections and estimates. 
B. The failure to show loss of net income precludes recovery. 
The law requires proof of net loss to support an award 
for loss of business; proof of gross loss only is insufficient. 
~Garcia v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
315 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1963); Dowling Supply & Equipment, 
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Inc. v. City of Anchorage, 490 P.2d 908 (Alaska 1971); 
Augustine v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
91 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1956); Cagle v. Southern Bell Telephone & 
Telegraph Co., 143 Ga. App. 603, 239 S.E.2d 182 (1977); 
Joy Floral Co. v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 563 S.W.2d 
190 (Tenn. App. 1977); Wade v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 
352 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). 
Respondent seeks to avoid the effect of this rule by 
claiming that its expenses were "fixed" and thus were unrelated 
to gross income. The fact is, however, that no such evidence 
appears in the record. Respondent's statements, therefore, 
are an attempt to remedy a fatal deficiency in the evidence, 
and this Court should not countenance such tactics. 
Respondent erroneously cites Security Development Co. v. 
Fedco, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 306, 462 P.2d 700 (1969), for the 
proposition that evidence of a decline in gross receipts is 
sufficient to sustain a verdict. In that case (as shown by 
the quotation in Respondent's Brief), there was evidence 
that net profits were directly related to gross profits. No 
such evidence exists in the present case. If, as Respondent 
argues, its expenses were fixed, it would have been a simple 
matter to produce evidence of that fact; the failure to do 
so indicates that the "best evidence reasonably obtainable" 
was not presented. Cf. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph 
Co. v. Hinchcliffe, 204 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1953). Hence, 
this Court should reverse the damage award. 
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Respondent's contention that Mountain Bell waived its 
right to require evidence of loss of net profits by stipulating 
that Respondent's income tax returns not be introduced into 
evidence is plainly wrong. A simple stipulation that Mountain 
Bell will not offer Respondent's tax returns falls far short 
of an agreement which alters the measure of damages and 
relieves Respondent of its burden of proof. If Respondent 
had offered the returns, it might have provided a basis for 
establishing the relationship between gross income and net 
income. But it was Respondent which sought their exclusion; 
therefore, Respondent cannot now be heard to complain of it. 
In summary, the legal authority before the Court in 
this case establishes that to recover for loss of business a 
plaintiff must show an actual loss of business resulting in 
a loss of net profits and that such loss was proximately 
caused by the wrongful act of the defendant. In this case, 
Respondent has failed to show any of those elements; hence, 
the damage award must be reversed. 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES. 
Respondent does not seriously contend that Mountain 
Bell acted with malice; rather, it argues that mere "willfulness", 
in the sense of intentionally committing an act, is sufficient 
for punitive damages. That is not the law in Utah or in 
other jurisdictions, as the following will demonstrate. 
-25-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respondent predicates, its punitive damage claim on Utah 
Code Ann. §_ 54-7-22. That reliance is misplaced. Applicable 
case law establishes that that statute does not create a 
general cause of action for service problems. A cause of 
action under that statute arises only where a public utility 
fails to perform a specific act required by statute or 
Commission order. If Mountain Bell had willfully failed to 
comply with the Public Service Commission order which required 
it to place a live intercept, a claim under Section 54-7-22 
might have arisen. But Mountain Bell complied with the 
order. Hence, that section is inapplicable. 
Furthermore, Respondent cannot assert a claim under 
Section 54-7-22 which would defeat the application of the 
tariff limitation of liability. In Waters v. Pacific Telephone, 
12 Cal. 3d 1, 523 P.2d 1161, 114 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1974), the 
California Supreme Court squarely faced the same issue 
presented in this case. The plaintiff there sued to recover 
damages allegedly resulting from defendant's failure to 
provide adequate telephone service. Plaintiff contended 
that the action was permitted by Section 2106 of the California 
Public Utilities Code, which is virtually identical to 
Utah's Section 54-7-22. The court was faced with the potential 
conflict between Section 2106 and another provision of the 
Code, Section 1759, which divested lower courts of jurisdiction 
to "review, revise, correct or annul" any order of the 
Public Utilities Commission (Section 1759 is virtually 
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identical to Utah's Section 54-7-16). Affirming the trial 
court's dismissal of the complaint on the basis of the 
tariff limitation of liability, the court stated: 
Since an award of substantial damages to 
plaintiff would be contrary to the policy adopted 
by the Commission and would interfere with the 
Commission's regulation of telephone utilities, 
we have concluded that Section 1759 bars the 
instant action. 
523 P.2d at 1162. 
See also Shoemaker v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
559 P.2d 721 (Colo. App. 1976); Burke v. Illinois Bell Telephone 
Co., 348 Ill. App. 529, 109 N.E. 2d 358 (1952); State ex rel. 
Mount~in States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. District Court, 
503 P.2d 526 (Mont. 1972), Driscoll v. New York Telephone Co., 
70 Misc. 2d 377, 334 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1972); Leighton v. New York 
Telephone Co., 61 N.Y.S. 2d 112 (1946). 
Under the holding and rationale of Waters and the other 
cases cited, Respondent's claim for damage for inadequate 
service under Section 54-7-22 would be barred. Hence, 
Respondent cannot assert that statute as a basis for recovery 
of punitive damages, and Instruction 5-0, which essentially 
quoted Section 54-7-22, was given in error. (R. 327.) 
Respondent's reliance on Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-1 and 
54-3-8 as a basis for a cause of action for inadequate 
service is also misplaced. In Abraham v. New York Telephone Co., 
380 N.Y.S. 2d 969 (1976), the plaintiff relied on a New York 
statute that is very similar to Utah's Section 54-3-1, 
arguing that it created an absolute statutory duty that any 
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interruption of service constituted inadequate service as a 
matter of law, and that the company was strictly liable for 
all damages that resulted therefrom. The court rejected 
plaintiff's argument and applied the tariff limitation of 
liability. In analyzing the New York statute, the court 
considered the public policy ramifications of limiting the 
liability of the telephone company. The court stated: 
Section 91 does not stand in splendid isolation, 
but is part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme for 
public utilities. The requirement that 'instrumentalities 
and facilities' must be 'adequate', must be read as a 
statutory guide to the primary responsibility of the 
commission, which is the supervision and control of 
'rates, rentals and charges' for service .... The 
rates for service, insofar as Section 91 may be 
germane, must be fixed so that the telephone company's 
instrumentalities and facilities shall be adequate 'to 
its business'. This is a far cry from the sweeping 
construction given this statute by plaintiff: That 
the facilities must be adequate (meaning without any 
interruption) 'to every subscriber'. The notion that 
Section 91 confers a private right of action has 
been rejected by courts in the past and the liability 
imposed by Section 93 [virtually identical to Utah's 
§ 54-7-22] has been limited to violation of a direct 
order of prohibition or command by the Public Service 
Commission. 
Id. at 971. 
The court reasoned further that "to impose the kind of 
liability contended for by plaintiff" would have "a catastrophic 
impact on the rates to be charged the public at large for 
telephone service". Id. at 972. Accord Garrison v. Pacific 
Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 45 Ore. App. 523, 608 P.2d 
1206 (1980). 
Respondent's argument tqat intentional behavior suffices 
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for punitive damages is wrong. Respondent relies on disjunctive 
language in Clayton v. Crossroads Equipment Co., No. 17013 
(Utah, filed Sept. 17, 1982) ("willful or malicious"), yet 
the "established jurisprudence of this state" upon which the 
statement in Clayton was based indicates clearly that conduct 
must be both willful and malicious in order to support 
punitive damages. E.g., First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards, 
Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 
37 (Utah 1980); Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 
605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 
(Utah 1975); Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1975); 
Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 
(1969); Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 152, 379 P.2d 380 
(1963); Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962); 
Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1952); Calhoun 
v. Universal Credit Co., 106 Utah 66, 146 P.2d 284 (1944). 
See also the following cases, decided subsequent to Clayton: 
Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., Case No. 17359 
(Utah, filed Dec. 14, 1982); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. 
Isom, Case No. 17264 (Utah, filed Dec. 10, 1982). 
As stated in Smoot v. Lund, supra: 
[Exemplary damages] may be awarded only where 
a willful and malicious injury has been perpetrated. 
369 P.2d at 936 (emphasis added). 
In addition, it should be noted that the term "willful" 
is subject to many interpretations, including "premeditated; 
malicious; done with evil intent or with a bad motive or 
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purpose, or with indifference to the actual consequences; 
unlawful; without legal justification." Black's Law Dictionary 
1774 (rev. 4th Ed. 1968). In the context of th,e present 
case, this court should be guided by the decisions of other 
courts that have interpreted similar phrases in similar 
contexts. See discussion, supra, pp. 14-19. 
Even the cases cited by Respondent hold that punitive 
damages are not appropriate in such actions. In Southwestern 
Bell Telephone Co. v. Reeves, supra, cited by Respondent, 
the court reversed a $50,000.00 punitive damage award. In 
Sommerville v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., supra, 
also cited by_ Respondent, the court held that where the 
telephone company acted in good faith in disconnecting 
plaintiff's telephone service for non-payment, punitive 
damages were not permitted even though the jury found that 
the disconnection was wrongful and without justification. 
In denying a claim for pun1tive damages, the court in 
Warner v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 428 S.W.2d 596 
(Mo. App. 1968), observed: 
[W]e have not found that in any action against 
a telephone company for error or mistake, the court 
has held the conduct to be willful, malicious or 
reckless. 
Id. at 603. 
In the present case, Mountain Bell's actions in placing 
the mechanical intercept were taken under a good faith 
belief that it had the right to place an intercept on Respondent's 
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line. In placing the live intercept, Mountain Bell was 
simply following the express order of the Public Service 
Commission. Under these circumstances, as a matter of law, 
Mountain Bell should not be subject to punitive damages. 
POINT V 
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S 
FEES. 
Respondent's claim for attorney's fees may be disposed 
of summarily for the following reasons: 
1. Respondent has not cross-appealed the trial court's 
refusal to give jury instructions regarding attorney's fees, 
and has raised the issue for the first time in its Brief. 
2. The Telalease provides for attorney's fees only to 
Mountain Bell upon the lessee's (Respondent's) default, not 
vice versa. (See Ex. 6, ,[ 23.) 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, being an enactment of 
the 1981 legislature, was not in effect at the time this 
action was filed. 
4. Respondent did not plead or prove a violation of 47 
u.s.c. § 206. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the numerous errors of law and insufficient 
evidence detailed in this Brief and in Appellant's first 
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Brief, this Court should reverse the judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /1...ftt day of January, 1983. 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
By:~4~ 
Froya:Jensen, Attorney 
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